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H
Lindsay v. Pacific Topsoils, Inc.Wash.App. Div.
1,2005.
Court of Appeals of Washington,Division 1.
James D. LINDSAY, Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
v.
PACIFIC TOPSOILS, INC., a Washington
Corporation, and Dave and Sandra Forman, a marital
community, Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
Harbor Development Services, LLC, a Washington
limited liability company, Third Party Defendant.
No. 54487-0-1.
Aug. 29, 2005.
Publication Ordered Sept. 26, 2005.
Background: After employee won favorable verdict
on his wrongful discharge claim, parties filed various
motions to determine amount of interest owed to
employee on judgment. After finding that interest on
verdict began to accrue from verdict date, but interest
on costs and attorney fees began to accrue from later
date of effective judgment, the Superior Court, King
County, Glenna Hall J., ultimately entered order
declaring that the judgment was satisfied in full.
Employee appealed and employer cross-appealed.

Holdings:
held that:

The Court of Appeals, Appelwick, J.,

(1) because judgment was affirmed on appeal,
interest ran from date of verdict, and
(2) amount of an award of attorney fees is not
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award.
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228XX Payment, Satisfaction, Merger, and
Discharge
228k895 k. Entry of Credits on Partial
Satisfaction. Most Cited Cases
Trial court erred in treating payment by defendant as
a partial satisfaction of the judgment, thereby causing
interest to accrue only on the unpaid principal;
because plaintiff could only withdraw the money
from the court's registry if he agreed that the money
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment, the
payment was conditional, not partial satisfaction, and
interest should have continued to accrue on the whole
judgment. West's RCWA 4.56.100(1).
121 Interest 219 €=>22(1)
219 Interest
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
219k22 Judgments
219k22(l) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to
compensate a party having the right to use money
when it has been denied use of that money.
131 Appeal and Error 30 €=>893(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKF) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate Court
3Qk893(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's application of
a statute de novo.
1H Interest 219 €^>39(3)

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
West Headnotes
111 Interest 219 € ^ 5 6
219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k56 k. Mode of Computation in General.
Most Cited Cases
Judgment 228 €^>895
228 Judgment

219 Interest
219111 Time and Computation
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in
General
219k39(3) k. Interest from Date of
Judgment or Decree. Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not err in ruling that interest on
plaintiffs judgment began to accrue from the date of
the verdict and not the effective date of the judgment,
since statute provides that when a verdict is affirmed
on review, interest accrues from the date of the
verdict, and that is what happened. West's RCWA
4.56.110(4).
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J51 Interest 219 € ^ 3 9 ( 3 )
219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in
General
219k39(3) k. Interest from Date of
Judgment or Decree. Most Cited Cases
Interest 219 €=>41.1
219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k41 Stipulations as to Time
219k41.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
While judgments generally bear interest from the date
of entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict
once a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, and an
agreed effective date of the judgment does not
control the date for interest accrual after the case is
affirmed on appeal.
161 Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 9 3 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKF) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate Court
30k893(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 9 8 4 ( 5 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKTO Discretion of Lower Court
30k984 Costs and Allowances
30k984(5) k. Attorneys' Fees. Most Cited
Cases
The test for reviewing an award of attorney fees is
two-pronged: (1) court must determine whether the
relevant statute provides for an award of fees, which
is a question of law and is reviewed de novo, and (2)
if it is established that a legal basis exists for the
award, court reviews the amount of the award under
the abuse of discretion standard.
121 Labor and Employment 231H €=>327
231H Labor and Employment
231HV Intellectual Property Rights and Duties
231Hk313 Actions

231Hk327 k. Costs and Attorney Fees. Most
Cited Cases
Under statute providing that plaintiff who recovers
judgment for wages or salary is entitled to attorney
fees, successful plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees
incurred in responding to defendant's motions to
satisfy the judgment and motions to clarify the court's
rulings, and was successful in opposing the motions
and prevailed on the issue of when interest began to
accrue; allowing a party who successfully obtains
interest on money to which he or she is entitled to
recover attorney fees is consistent with the broad,
remedial purpose of the statute. West's RCWA
49.48.030.
181 Costs 102 €^>252
102 Costs
102X On Appeal or Error
102k252 k. Attorney's Fees on Appeal or Error.
Most Cited Cases
In general, if the applicable law allows the trial court
to grant attorney fees, that statute is also interpreted
as allowing fees to the prevailing party on appeal,
and should also apply to post-judgment litigation in
defense of the amount of the judgment.
121 Costs 102 €=>194.18
102 Costs
102 VIII Attorney Fees
102kl94.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours;
Rate. Most Cited Cases
The amount of an award of attorney fees is not
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award, and
there is no abuse of discretion in a fee award when
the only argument is that the fees grossly exceeded
the value of the case.

**104 William T. Grimm, Davis Grimm Payne &
Marra, Jennifer L. Mora, Jackson Lewis LLP, Seattle,
WA, for Appellant.
James R. Dickens, Miller Nash LLP, Seattle, WA, for
Respondents.
APPELWICK, J.
*675 f 1 James Lindsay won a favorable verdict on
his employment claim against Pacific Topsoils, Inc.,
(PTI).
Lindsay appeals the trial court's
characterization of PTI's payment into the court's
registry as a partial satisfaction of judgment, which
stopped the accrual of interest. Lindsay disputed the
amount of the judgment, and argues that because
PTI's payment required that he accept the payment as
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judgment in full, it was a conditional payment, and
interest should have continued to run until
disbursement. We agree with Lindsay and reverse
and remand for determination of the appropriate
amount of interest.
If 2 PTI cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that
interest on the judgment began to run from the date
of the verdict, not the date the judgment became
effective. We affirm this ruling because PTI had
unsuccessfully appealed the merits of the case, thus
triggering the provisions of RCW 4.56.110(4) that
require interest to run from the verdict date. We also
affirm the award to Lindsay of attorney fees incurred
establishing that the interest on the judgment ran
effective from the date of the verdict.

*676 FACTS
1f 3 On February 14, 2002, James Lindsay obtained a
favorable verdict against Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and
Dave and Sandra Forman (PTI). Lindsay had sued
for wrongful discharge, breach of contract,
promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation.
The jury awarded Lindsay $2,028,083.00 — in
damages.

FN1. The judgment was for $2,028,088.00.
f 4 The trial court ordered a stay of the entry of
judgment that was filed on March 27, 2002. The
judgment was stayed pending resolution of PTI's
post-trial motions. The order established that:
[i]f judgment in any amount is entered in favor of
plaintiff Lindsay after this Court decides the post-trial
motions set for April 4, 2002, as a condition of this
stay defendants Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and Dave
Forman agree that the judgment shall be effective as
ofMarchl4,2002.
The trial court entered judgment for Lindsay on May
9, 2002, affirming the jury's verdict amount and
awarding Lindsay additional costs and attorney fees
in the amount of $114,976.56.
1f 5 In June 2002, PTI appealed to this court, and in
September 2003 we affirmed the judgment in favor
of Lindsay. PTI filed a petition for review with the
Washington State Supreme Court in October 2003,
which was denied in May 2004.
1 6 Meanwhile, on December 23, 2003, PTI filed a
notice of payment of judgment in full into the court's
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registry. The amount PTI paid was $2,600,336.55,
which included the initial verdict plus the costs and
attorney fees awarded. This payment also included
12 percent per annum interest on the judgment
amount, calculated since March 14, 2002, the day the
judgment was agreed effective. The notice stated
that the money "is available immediately to plaintiff
James D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full
satisfaction of judgment for this amount per RCW
4.56.100(1)."
*677 ^f 7 The next day PTI filed a motion requesting
the trial court declare that PTI had paid the judgment
for Lindsay in full. Lindsay opposed the motion,
arguing that the interest should have been calculated
to accrue from February 14, 2002, the date of the
verdict, instead of from March 14, 2002.
In
February 2004, the trial court denied PTI's motion.
In response to PTI's motion for clarification, the trial
court stated that interest on the verdict began to
accrue from the verdict date, but interest on the costs
and attorney fees began to accrue from the effective
judgment date.
**105 f 8 Litigation on this issue continued. PTI
filed motions in February and May 2004 attempting
to clarify the amount remaining that PTI was to pay.
In April 2004, Lindsay requested costs and fees
incurred in responding to PTI's motions. The trial
court awarded Lindsay additional costs and attorney
fees totaling $29,643.50. In response to PTI's May
2004 motion, the trial court reiterated in June 2004 its
holding regarding when interest began accruing.
The court further ordered that PTI's December 2003
payment into the court's registry was applied first to
satisfy the accrued statutory interest, and then to the
principal,— leaving $17,926.97 in unpaid principal
as of December 2003. The court determined that
PTI owed Lindsay $17,926.97 plus 12 percent
interest per year on that amount, accruing from the
date of the payment into the registry. The court
reiterated that, in addition, PTI owed Lindsay the fees
and costs awarded the month before.

FN2. The principal included the costs and
attorney fees awarded to Lindsay at trial.
^ 9 PTI paid the indicated amount into the court's
registry several days later.
Lindsay requested
reconsideration, asserting that the December 2003
payment did not partially satisfy the judgment
because it was conditional. Accordingly, Lindsay
argued, he was entitled to post-judgment interest in
the entire judgment through June 2004. But several
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days later, the trial court entered an order declaring
that the judgment was satisfied in full.
f 10 Lindsay appeals the court's order declaring the
judgment satisfied in full.
PTI cross-appeals,
assigning *678 error to the court's determination that
interest began to accrue on the verdict date, and
assigning error to the court's May 2004 award of fees
and costs to Lindsay.

ANALYSIS
I. Characterization of the December Payment

[111 11 Lindsay asserts that the trial court's June 3,
2004 order specifying the amounts PTI still owed
Lindsay was in error.— Specifically, he claims that
the trial court should not have treated the December
2003 payment as a partial satisfaction of the
judgment, thereby causing interest to accrue only on
the unpaid principal. Instead, Lindsay claims that
the December 2003 payment was conditional, and
accordingly, interest should have continued to accrue
on the whole judgment.

FN3. Lindsay also assigns error to the trial
court's denial of his motion for
reconsideration, and the trial court's order on
satisfaction of judgment in full. As these
assignments of error all flow from the same
issue, we do not address them separately.
T| 12 PTI further contends that Lindsay was free to
remove the December 2003 funds from the registry at
any time, and thus the tender of funds was not
conditional. PTI argues that the provision indicating
the money was "full satisfaction of judgment for this
amount " meant that the judgment was satisfied as to
the amount of money tendered, "limiting the dispute
to only the additional $17,926.97 Lindsay requested."
[211 13 PTI is incorrect. PTI's notice of payment of
judgment in frill contained the provision that the
money "is available immediately to plaintiff James
D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full satisfaction
of judgment for this amount per RCW 4.56.100(1)."
This clause constituted a condition-Lindsay could
only withdraw the money if he agreed that the money
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment. "The
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to
compensate a party having the right to use money
when it has been denied use of that money."
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*679Aguirre v. AT & T Wireless Services, 118
Wash.App. 236, 24 L 75 P.3d 603 (2003V Because
Lindsay was denied use of the money due to the
condition on the payment, interest should have
continued to run on the entire judgment, from the
date of the verdict until the date of disbursement.
% 14 This result is supported by case law. In Steele
v. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. 773. 787, 982 P.2d 619
(1999), judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff, and the defendant** 106 paid the judgment
into the court's registry, "with an instruction that the
funds should be held until further order of the court."
The plaintiff was granted writs of garnishment and
sought supplemental proceedings. Lundgren, 96
Wash.App. at 787. 982 P.2d 619. She also sought an
order of disbursement, requesting that the payment
only be considered partial satisfaction of the
judgment because she was entitled to interest.
Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 619. The
trial court granted interest from the date of the
judgment onwards. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787,
982 P.2d 619. On appeal, the defendant argued the
interest award was in error because the plaintiff had a
duty to limit her damages. The court noted that
"there was some confusion whether the funds were
available and would be released unconditionally,"
and accordingly upheld the award of post-judgment
interest. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d
619.
Similarly, here there was a provision that
established a condition on the December 2003 funds'
release. The rationale in Lundzren is thus applicable
to the case at hand.
1 \5Inre Bailey's Estate. 56 Wash.2d 623. 354 P.2d
920 (1960), further supports this result. In Bailey, a
woman bought property at an auction, but failed to
pay the amount of the bid. Bailey, 56 Wash.2d at
625, 354 P.2d 920. After a court entered a judgment
against her, the appellant deposited only a portion of
the money with the clerk of the court. Bailey, 56
Wash.2d at 625, 354 P.2d 920. Several months later,
the trial court entered an order authorizing the clerk
to pay the amount received by the appellant. Bailey,
56 Wash.2d at 626. 354 P.2d 920. The trial courtruled that the opposing party should recover interest
on the entire amount up until that date. Bailey. 56
Wash.2d at 626, 354 P.2d 920. *680 The Bailey
Court reasoned that:
although appellant paid this amount into the clerk of
the court on the aforesaid date, she did not direct the
clerk to apply this payment to a reduction of the
amount of the judgment. The clerk made no docket
entry indicating partial satisfaction of judgment; nor
did he release payment ... until the court had issued

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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its
order authorizing him to do so
We are
convinced that under these circumstances interest
was properly chargeable on the entire amount of the
judgment up to [the order date], m accordance with
the trial court's ruling
Bailey. 56 Wash 2d at 628, 354 P 2d 920 Since PTI
did not direct the clerk to apply the payment as
partial satisfaction, and the clerk did not do so, Bailey
supports a finding that the December 2003 payment
was not partial satisfaction
\ 16 PTI argues that post-judgment interest is an
equitable remedy and because Lindsay initially
refused payment of the judgment for tax purposes, he
should not be entitled to post-judgment interest on
the full amount Essentially, PTI claims that because
Lindsay did not accept payment before the December
2003 deposit and did not move to withdraw the
deposited amount for several months, he contributed
to the delay and should not be permitted to profit
from it But Lindsay had good cause not to accept
the payment-he believed he was entitled to a greater
amount of interest
Further, the wording of the
notice of payment of judgment in full left Lindsay
vulnerable to forfeiture of that claim if he had
withdrawn the money
Under the circumstances,
equitable principles do not dictate that Lmdsay be
deprived of interest on the entire amount of the
judgment
f 17 The trial court erred in determining that the
deposit of funds in the registry stopped the running of
mterest on the judgment
Lindsay is entitled to
interest on the judgment from the date of the verdict
until the date that registry funds were disbursed to
him Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must
recalculate the interest due, adjust the application of
moneys paid to interest and to principle, and
determine what amounts remain unpaid

*681 II. Date that Interest Began to Accrue
\
18 PTI contends that the trial court erred in
denying PTI's motion for satisfaction of judgment m
relation to the December **107 23, 2003 payment
— Specifically, PTI claims that the trial court erred
m holding that interest on the judgment began to
accrue on the verdict date, rather than on the date the
judgment was effective PTI claims that Washington
case law establishes this proposition, and further, that
the parties contracted that the mterest would begin to
accrue on the effective date of the judgment

FN4 Lindsay claims that PTI did not timely
file a notice of cross-appeal, and, thus, some
of the issues PTI has raised m its crossappeal are not properly before this court
Specifically, Lindsay claims that because
PTI did not file a Notice of Appeal withm
30 days of the specific trial court decision
PTI wanted reviewed, PTPs cross-appeal
should be dismissed
However, a
commissioner of this court heard this issue
and decided m favor of PTI Accordmgly,
we consider PTI's cross-appeal
HI If 19 RCW4 56 110(4) m provides, in pertinent
part

FN5 In 2004, the legislature added a section
to this statute, changing then RCW
4 56 110(3) to RCW 4 56 110(4)
[ Judgments shall bear interest from the date of entry
at the maximum rate permitted under RCW
19 52 020 on the date of entry thereof In any case
where a court is directed on review to enter judgment
on a verdict or in any case where a judgment entered
on a verdict is wholly or partly affirmed on review,
interest on the judgment or on that portion of the
judgment affirmed shall date back to and shall accrue
from the date the verdict was rendered
We review a trial court's application of a statute de
novo Hadley v Maxwell 120 Wash App 137, 145,
84 P 3d 286 (2004)
[4] 11 20 The trial court did not err in holding that
interest began to accrue from the date of the verdict
because the language of RCW 4 56 110(4) dictates
that result The statute provides that when a verdict
is affirmed on review, interest accrues from the date
of the verdict This is exactly what happened in this
case PTI appealed the verdict to this court, and we
affirmed
The Washington Supreme Court denied
certiorari
Accordingly, under the *682 plam
language of RCW 4 56 110(4), the interest began to
accrue from the date of the verdict
f
21 Case law is also in accord with this
interpretation In Hadley, 120 Wash App at 140, 84
P3d 2861 the plaintiffs obtained a favorable
judgment
The defendants appealed to Division
Three of this Court, which affirmed
Hadley, 120
Wash APP at 140, 84 P3d 286
The defendants
then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court
solely on a liability issue, and the court reversed
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Hadlev, 120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. On
remand, a jury found for the plaintiffs again. Hadlev,
120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. The plaintiffs
sought interest on the earlier damages verdict
accruing from the date of the verdict. Hadlev 120
Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. Division Three
agreed, noting that the Supreme Court had only
reversed on the liability issue, thus impliedly
affirming the earlier damages award. Hadlev, 120
Wash.App. at 146-47, 84 P.3d 286. The Hadlev
court then concluded that because it had affirmed the
earlier damages award without challenge, the interest
accrued from the date of the earlier verdict. Hadlev,
120 Wash.App. at 147, 84 P.3d 286.
f 22 PTI claims that Kiesslinz v. N. W. Greyhound
Lines, 38 Wash.2d 289, 229 P.2d 335 (1951), and
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
142 Wash.2d 654, 15 P.3d 115 (2000) dictate a
different result. PTI is incorrect. In Kiessling, the
Court held that u[t]here is no statute in this state
providing for the accrual of interest from the date of a
verdict." Kiesslim, 38 Wash.2d at 297, 229 P.2d
335. However, Kiessling was decided before the
pertinent provision of RCW 4.56.110(4) was enacted.
Accordingly, it is not dispositive.
1 23 Weyerhaeuser is also not dispositive. In that
case, Weyerhaeuser sought a declaration of coverage
from numerous insurance companies with regard to
property damage at several allegedly polluted sites
that Weyerhaeuser was required to clean up.
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 661, 15 P.3d 115.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the insurers with respect to some of the sites.
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 662, 15 P.3d 115.
On appeal, summary judgment was reversed, and the
issue went to **108 trial. 'k6S3Weverhaeuser, 142
Wash.2d at 662-63. 15 P.3d 115. After a jury found
for Weyerhaeuser, the trial court awarded interest on
the cost of the clean-up of one of the sites from the
date of the verdict. Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at
687, 15 P.3d 115.
The Court on appeal cited
Kiessling and held that interest for the nonliquidated
damages ran only from the date of judgment.
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 687, 15 P.3d 115.
However, in Weyerhaeuser, the appeal reversed a
summary judgment and reinstated the case.
No
judgment on the merits existed at that time, therefore
no judgment was affirmed on appeal. When the trial
court entered judgment and awarded interest dating
back to the verdict, the provision in RCW
4.56.110(4) had not yet been triggered and interest
dating back to the verdict was not yet appropriate.

Fage o

[5] \ 24 PTI also asserts that Lindsay is estopped
from claiming that interest accrual began on the
verdict date because Lindsay agreed that the
judgment would be effective on March 14, 2002.
While it is true that Lindsay signed the order staying
judgment that stated that the original judgment would
be effective on March 14, 2002, this order does not
even reference RCW 4.56.110(4), let alone expressly
purport to modify the parties' statutory rights after the
judgment has been affirmed on review.
While
judgments generally bear interest from the date of
entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict once
a judgment has been affirmed on appeal.
Accordingly, the agreed effective date of the
judgment does not control the date for interest
accrual after the case was affirmed on appeal.

III. Award of Fees to Lindsay
H 25 PTI asserts that the trial court erred in awarding
Lindsay attorney fees in responding to PTI's efforts to
satisfy the judgment. PTI claims that fees could only
be awarded under RCW 49.48.030, and that the
subject of the dispute is so far removed from the
purpose of that statute that the fees were not justified.
Further, PTI contends, the amount of fees awarded
was so out of proportion to the amount of money in
dispute that the award was unreasonable.
[6] *684 \ 26 The test for reviewing an award of
attorney fees is two-pronged.
First, we must
determine whether the relevant statute provides for an
award of fees; this is a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. Mehlenbacher v. DeMont, 103
Wash.App. 240, 244, 11 P.3d 871 (2000). Once we
have established that a legal basis exists for the
award, we then review the amount of the award under
the abuse of discretion standard. Tradewell Group,
Inc. v. Mavis, 71 Wash.App. 120, 126, 857 P.2d 1053
(1993).
J71T[ 27 RCW 49.48.030 provides, in pertinent part,
that "[i]n any action in which any person is
successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary
owed to him, reasonable attorney's fees, in an amount
to be determined by the court, shall be assessed
against said employer or former employer [.]" The
statute is remedial and is entitled to liberal
construction to effect its purpose. Dautel v. Heritage
Home Center, Inc., 89 Wash.App. 148, 152, 948 P.2d
397(1997).
f 28 The statute provides a basis for the trial court's
award of fees to Lindsay. Lindsay requested fees for
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responding to PTI's motions to satisfy the judgment
and motions to clarify the court's rulings. Lindsay
also requested fees for discussions with PTI
attempting to resolve the dispute.
Lindsay was
successful in opposing PTI's motions and prevailed
on the issue of when interest began to accrue. "The
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to
compensate a party having the right to use money
when it has been denied use of that money." Aguirre,
118 Wash.App. at 24 L 15 P.3d 603. Establishing
the amount of interest due is part of determining the
amount of recovery to which the party is entitled.
This is not so far removed from the purposes of a
statute that is aimed at compensating individuals who
successfully bring wage and salary claims.
An
interpretation of RCW 49.48.030 that allows a party
who successfully obtains interest on money to which
he or she is entitled to recover attorney fees is
consistent with the broad, remedial purpose of the
statute. Accordingly, the statute supports the fee
award.
[81 *685 t 29 PTI notes that the issue of whether
RCW 49.48.030 allows for attorney fees in postjudgment litigation has not been **109 decided in
Washington. While this is true, there are cases from
other jurisdictions that support Lindsay's position. In
Velez v. Vassallo, 203 F.Supp.2d. 312, 315
(S.D.N.Y.2002), the defendants challenged a Fair
Labor Standards Act claim default judgment against
them almost a year after the judgment.
The
reviewing court held that plaintiffs were entitled to
reasonable fees and costs in defending that motion,
noting that "prevailing plaintiffs in FLSA cases are
entitled to attorneys fees for prosecuting or defending
appeals.
Plaintiffs successful defense of a postjudgment motion is indistinguishable in principle."
Velez, 203 F.Supp.2d at 315 (internal citations
omitted). Similarly, in Wevant v. Okst, 198 F.3d
31L 316 (2nd Cir.1999). the court held that "[a]
prevailing 1983 plaintiff is entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys fees," and that "[t]his principle
applies not only to the cost of obtaining a favorable
judgment but also to the cost of successfully
defending that judgment, whether against postjudgment motions, or against an appeal." (internal
citations omitted). In general, if the applicable law
allows the trial court to grant attorney fees, that
statute is also interpreted as allowing fees to the
prevailing party on appeal. 14A Karl B. Tegland,
Washington Practice: Civil Procedure 37.13, at 572
(1st ed.2003). This rule should also apply to postjudgment litigation in defense of the amount of the
judgment.
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\ 30 Further, the amount awarded was not an abuse
of discretion. Lindsays attorney submitted a bill for
services rendered for Lindsay between November
2003 and April 2004. This bill included costs and
fees for services related to opposing PTIs motions
regarding interest and the removal of liens on PTIs
properties.
The total amount of the bill was
$29,681.00.
The trial court awarded Lindsay
$29,643.00, apparently accepting virtually all of the
fees and costs as reasonable. PTI asserts that the fee
award is unreasonable because it is significantly more
than the *686 amount in controversy. PTI points out
that while the award was over $29,000, the amount in
controversy was only one months interest:
$17,926.97.
[21 f 31 PTIs assertions are unavailing. The amount
of the award is not dispositive of the reasonableness
of the award. Further, PTI has made no specific
allegations that the hourly fee charged was
unreasonable or that Lindsays attorneys charged for
hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort,
or otherwise unproductive time. See Mayer v. City
of Seattle, 102 Wash.App. 66, 82, 10 P.3d 408
(2000).
Washington courts have refused to find
abuse of discretion in a fee award when the only
argument is that the fees grossly exceeded the value
of the case. See, e.g., Lav v. Hass, 112 Wash.App.
818,826,51 P.3d 130(2002) (refusing to overturn an
award when the defendant's sole argument was that
the fee awarded was 31 times the total value of the
case). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
the award of fees.

IV. Lindsay's Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal
f 32 Lindsay requests his attorney fees under RAP
18.1 and RCW 49.48.030 for both his underlying
action and in defending his result against PTI's crossappeal.
As previously noted, RCW 49.48.030
provides that employees who successfully recover
judgment for wages or salary owed shall receive
reasonable attorney fees. Lindsay has prevailed on
his appeal, and he has successfully defended against
PTI's cross-appeal. Accordingly, we award him his
attorney fees and costs on appeal.
% 33 Affirmed in part.
Reversed in part and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WE CONCUR: ELLINGTON, A.C.J., and BAKER,
J.
Wash.App. Div. 1,2005.
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Lindsay v. Pacific Topsoils, Inc.Wash.App. Div.
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Court of Appeals of Washington,Division 1.
James D. LINDSAY, Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
v.
PACIFIC TOPSOILS, INC., a Washington
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community, Respondents/Cross-Appellants,
Harbor Development Services, LLC, a Washington
limited liability company, Third Party Defendant.
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Background: After employee won favorable verdict
on his wrongful discharge claim, parties filed various
motions to determine amount of interest owed to
employee on judgment. After finding that interest on
verdict began to accrue from verdict date, but interest
on costs and attorney fees began to accrue from later
date of effective judgment, the Superior Court, King
County, Glenna Hall J., ultimately entered order
declaring that the judgment was satisfied in full.
Employee appealed and employer cross-appealed.

Holdings:
held that:

The Court of Appeals, Appelwick, J.,

(1) because judgment was affirmed on appeal,
interest ran from date of verdict, and
(2) amount of an award of attorney fees is not
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award.
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228XX Payment, Satisfaction, Merger, and
Discharge
228k895 k. Entry of Credits on Partial
Satisfaction. Most Cited Cases
Trial court erred in treating payment by defendant as
a partial satisfaction of the judgment, thereby causing
interest to accrue only on the unpaid principal;
because plaintiff could only withdraw the money
from the court's registry if he agreed that the money
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment, the
payment was conditional, not partial satisfaction, and
interest should have continued to accrue on the whole
judgment. West's RCWA 4.56.1000).
121 Interest 219 €=>22(1)
219 Interest
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General
219k22 Judgments
219k22(T) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to
compensate a party having the right to use money
when it has been denied use of that money.
131 Appeal and Error 30 €=^>893(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKT) Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate Court
30k893(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's application of
a statute de novo.
J41 Interest 219 €^>39(3)

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
West Headnotes
111 Interest 219 € ^ 5 6
219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k56 k. Mode of Computation in General.
Most Cited Cases
Judgment 228 €^>895
228 Judgment

219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in
General
219k39(3) k. Interest from Date of
Judgment or Decree. Most Cited Cases
Trial court did not err in ruling that interest on
plaintiffs judgment began to accrue from the date of
the verdict and not the effective date of the judgment,
since statute provides that when a verdict is affirmed
on review, interest accrues from the date of the
verdict, and that is what happened. West's RCWA
4.56.110(4).
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151 Interest 219 € ^ 3 9 ( 3 )
219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in
General
219k39(3) k. Interest from Date of
Judgment or Decree. Most Cited Cases
Interest 219 €==>41.1
219 Interest
219III Time and Computation
219k41 Stipulations as to Time
219k41.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
While judgments generally bear interest from the date
of entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict
once a judgment has been affirmed on appeal, and an
agreed effective date of the judgment does not
control the date for interest accrual after the case is
affirmed on appeal.
161 Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 8 9 3 ( 1 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVIOT Trial De Novo
30k892 Trial De Novo
30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate Court
30k893(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
Appeal and Error 30 € ^ 9 8 4 ( 5 )
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVKH) Discretion of Lower Court
30k984 Costs and Allowances
30k984(5) k. Attorneys' Fees. Most Cited
Cases
The test for reviewing an award of attorney fees is
two-pronged: (1) court must determine whether the
relevant statute provides for an award of fees, which
is a question of law and is reviewed de novo, and (2)
if it is established that a legal basis exists for the
award, court reviews the amount of the award under
the abuse of discretion standard.
121 Labor and Employment 231H €=>327
231H Labor and Employment
231HV Intellectual Property Rights and Duties
231Hk313 Actions

231Hk327 k. Costs and Attorney Fees. Most
Cited Cases
Under statute providing that plaintiff who recovers
judgment for wages or salary is entitled to attorney
fees, successful plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees
incurred in responding to defendant's motions to
satisfy the judgment and motions to clarify the court's
rulings, and was successful in opposing the motions
and prevailed on the issue of when interest began to
accrue; allowing a party who successfully obtains
interest on money to which he or she is entitled to
recover attorney fees is consistent with the broad,
remedial purpose of the statute. West's RCWA
49.48.030.
181 Costs 102 €^>252
102 Costs
102X On Appeal or Error
102k252 k. Attorney's Fees on Appeal or Error.
Most Cited Cases
In general, if the applicable law allows the trial court
to grant attorney fees, that statute is also interpreted
as allowing fees to the prevailing party on appeal,
and should also apply to post-judgment litigation in
defense of the amount of the judgment.
121 Costs 102 € ^ 1 9 4 . 1 8
102 Costs
102VIII Attorney Fees
102kl94.18 k. Items and Amount; Hours;
Rate. Most Cited Cases
The amount of an award of attorney fees is not
dispositive of the reasonableness of the award, and
there is no abuse of discretion in a fee award when
the only argument is that the fees grossly exceeded
the value of the case.

**104 William T. Grimm, Davis Grimm Payne &
Marra, Jennifer L. Mora, Jackson Lewis LLP, Seattle,
WA, for Appellant.
James R. Dickens. Miller Nash LLP, Seattle, WA, for
Respondents.
APPELW1CK,J.
*675 | 1 James Lindsay won a favorable verdict on
his employment claim against Pacific Topsoils, Inc.,
(PTI).
Lindsay appeals the trial court's
characterization of PTI's payment into the court's
registry as a partial satisfaction of judgment, which
stopped the accrual of interest. Lindsay disputed the
amount of the judgment, and argues that because
PTI's payment required that he accept the payment as
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judgment in full, it was a conditional payment, and
interest should have continued to run until
disbursement. We agree with Lindsay and reverse
and remand for determination of the appropriate
amount of interest.
f 2 PTI cross-appeals the trial court's ruling that
interest on the judgment began to run from the date
of the verdict, not the date the judgment became
effective. We affirm this ruling because PTI had
unsuccessfully appealed the merits of the case, thus
triggering the provisions of RCW 4.56.110(4) that
require interest to run from the verdict date. We also
affirm the award to Lindsay of attorney fees incurred
establishing that the interest on the judgment ran
effective from the date of the verdict.

*676 FACTS
f 3 On February 14, 2002, James Lindsay obtained a
favorable verdict against Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and
Dave and Sandra Forman (PTI). Lindsay had sued
for wrongful discharge, breach of contract,
promissory estoppel and negligent misrepresentation.
The jury awarded Lindsay $2,028,083.00 — in
damages.

FN1. The judgment was for $2,028,088.00.
| 4 The trial court ordered a stay of the entry of
judgment that was filed on March 27, 2002. The
judgment was stayed pending resolution of PTI's
post-trial motions. The order established that:
[i]f judgment in any amount is entered in favor of
plaintiff Lindsay after this Court decides the post-trial
motions set for April 4, 2002, as a condition of this
stay defendants Pacific Topsoils, Inc. and Dave
Forman agree that the judgment shall be effective as
ofMarchl4,2002.
The trial court entered judgment for Lindsay on May
9, 2002, affirming the jury's verdict amount and
awarding Lindsay additional costs and attorney fees
in the amount of $114,976.56.
K 5 In June 2002, PTI appealed to this court, and in
September 2003 we affirmed the judgment in favor
of Lindsay. PTI filed a petition for review with the
Washington State Supreme Court in October 2003,
which was denied in May 2004.
f 6 Meanwhile, on December 23, 2003, PTI filed a
notice of payment of judgment in full into the court's
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registry. The amount PTI paid was $2,600,336.55,
which included the initial verdict plus the costs and
attorney fees awarded. This payment also included
12 percent per annum interest on the judgment
amount, calculated since March 14, 2002, the day the
judgment was agreed effective. The notice stated
that the money "is available immediately to plaintiff
James D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full
satisfaction of judgment for this amount per RCW
4.56.100(1)."
*677 f 7 The next day PTI filed a motion requesting
the trial court declare that PTI had paid the judgment
for Lindsay in full. Lindsay opposed the motion,
arguing that the interest should have been calculated
to accrue from February 14, 2002, the date of the
verdict, instead of from March 14, 2002.
In
February 2004, the trial court denied PTI's motion.
In response to PTI's motion for clarification, the trial
court stated that interest on the verdict began to
accrue from the verdict date, but interest on the costs
and attorney fees began to accrue from the effective
judgment date.
**105 | 8 Litigation on this issue continued. PTI
filed motions in February and May 2004 attempting
to clarify the amount remaining that PTI was to pay.
In April 2004, Lindsay requested costs and fees
incurred in responding to PTI's motions. The trial
court awarded Lindsay additional costs and attorney
fees totaling $29,643.50. In response to PTI's May
2004 motion, the trial court reiterated in June 2004 its
holding regarding when interest began accruing.
The court further ordered that PTI's December 2003
payment into the court's registry was applied first to
satisfy the accrued statutory interest, and then to the
principal,— leaving $17,926.97 in unpaid principal
as of December 2003. The court determined that
PTI owed Lindsay $17,926.97 plus 12 percent
interest per year on that amount, accruing from the
date of the payment into the registry. The court
reiterated that, in addition, PTI owed Lindsay the fees
and costs awarded the month before.

FN2. The principal included the costs and
attorney fees awarded to Lindsay at trial.
f 9 PTI paid the indicated amount into the court's
registry several days later.
Lindsay requested
reconsideration, asserting that the December 2003
payment did not partially satisfy the judgment
because it was conditional. Accordingly, Lindsay
argued, he was entitled to post-judgment interest in
the entire judgment through June 2004. But several
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days later, the trial court entered an order declaring
that the judgment was satisfied in full.
f 10 Lindsay appeals the court's order declaring the
judgment satisfied in full.
PTI cross-appeals,
assigning *678 error to the court's determination that
interest began to accrue on the verdict date, and
assigning error to the court's May 2004 award of fees
and costs to Lindsay.

ANALYSIS
I. Characterization of the December Payment

HI 1f 11 Lindsay asserts that the trial court's June 3,
2004 order specifying the amounts PTI still owed
Lindsay was in error.— Specifically, he claims that
the trial court should not have treated the December
2003 payment as a partial satisfaction of the
judgment, thereby causing interest to accrue only on
the unpaid principal. Instead, Lindsay claims that
the December 2003 payment was conditional, and
accordingly, interest should have continued to accrue
on the whole judgment.

FN3. Lindsay also assigns error to the trial
court's denial of his motion for
reconsideration, and the trial court's order on
satisfaction of judgment in full. As these
assignments of error all flow from the same
issue, we do not address them separately.
K 12 PTI further contends that Lindsay was free to
remove the December 2003 funds from the registry at
any time, and thus the tender of funds was not
conditional. PTI argues that the provision indicating
the money was "full satisfaction of judgment for this
amount " meant that the judgment was satisfied as to
the amount of money tendered, "limiting the dispute
to only the additional $17,926.97 Lindsay requested."
1211 13 PTI is incorrect. PTI's notice of payment of
judgment in fiill contained the provision that the
money "is available immediately to plaintiff James
D. Lindsay in exchange for entry of a full satisfaction
of judgment for this amount per RCW 4.56.100(1)."
This clause constituted a condition-Lindsay could
only withdraw the money if he agreed that the money
constituted a full satisfaction of judgment. "The
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to
compensate a party having the right to use money
when it has been denied use of that money."
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* 679Aguirre v. AT & T Wireless Services, 118
Wash.App. 236, 241, 75 P.3d 603 (2003). Because
Lindsay was denied use of the money due to the
condition on the payment, interest should have
continued to run on the entire judgment, from the
date of the verdict until the date of disbursement.
| 14 This result is supported by case law. In Steele
v. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. 773. 787, 982 P.2d 619
(1999), judgment was entered in favor of the
plaintiff, and the defendant** 106 paid the judgment
into the court's registry, "with an instruction that the
funds should be held until further order of the court."
The plaintiff was granted writs of garnishment and
sought supplemental proceedings. Lundzren, 96
Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 619. She also sought an
order of disbursement, requesting that the payment
only be considered partial satisfaction of the
judgment because she was entitled to interest.
Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d 619. The
trial court granted interest from the date of the
judgment onwards. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787,
982 P.2d 619. On appeal, the defendant argued the
interest award was in error because the plaintiff had a
duty to limit her damages. The court noted that
"there was some confusion whether the funds were
available and would be released unconditionally,"
and accordingly upheld the award of post-judgment
interest. Lundzren, 96 Wash.App. at 787, 982 P.2d
619.
Similarly, here there was a provision that
established a condition on the December 2003 funds'
release. The rationale in Lundzren is thus applicable
to the case at hand.
f \5Inre Bailey's Estate, 56 Wash.2d 623, 354 P.2d
920 (1960), further supports this result. In Bailey, a
woman bought property at an auction, but failed to
pay the amount of the bid. Bailey, 56 Wash.2d at
625, 354 P.2d 920. After a court entered a judgment
against her, the appellant deposited only a portion of
the money with the clerk of the court. Bailey, 56
Wash.2d at 625, 354 P.2d 920. Several months later,
the trial court entered an order authorizing the clerk
to pay the amount received by the appellant. Bailey,
56 Wash.2d at 626, 354 P.2d 920. The trial courtruled that the opposing party should recover interest
on the entire amount up until that date. Bailey, 56
Wash.2d at 626, 354 P.2d 920. *680 The Bailey
Court reasoned that:
although appellant paid this amount into the clerk of
the court on the aforesaid date, she did not direct the
clerk to apply this payment to a reduction of the
amount of the judgment. The clerk made no docket
entry indicating partial satisfaction of judgment; nor
did he release payment ... until the court had issued
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its ... order authorizing him to do so.
We are
convinced that under these circumstances interest
was properly chargeable on the entire amount of the
judgment up to [the order date], in accordance with
the trial court's ruling.
Bailey, 56 Wash.2d at 628, 354 P.2d 920. Since PTI
did not direct the clerk to apply the payment as
partial satisfaction, and the clerk did not do so, Bailey
supports a finding that the December 2003 payment
was not partial satisfaction.
f 16 PTI argues that post-judgment interest is an
equitable remedy and because Lindsay initially
refused payment of the judgment for tax purposes, he
should not be entitled to post-judgment interest on
the full amount. Essentially, PTI claims that because
Lindsay did not accept payment before the December
2003 deposit and did not move to withdraw the
deposited amount for several months, he contributed
to the delay and should not be permitted to profit
from it. But Lindsay had good cause not to accept
the payment-he believed he was entitled to a greater
amount of interest.
Further, the wording of the
notice of payment of judgment in full left Lindsay
vulnerable to forfeiture of that claim if he had
withdrawn the money.
Under the circumstances,
equitable principles do not dictate that Lindsay be
deprived of interest on the entire amount of the
judgment.
\ 17 The trial court erred in determining that the
deposit of funds in the registry stopped the running of
interest on the judgment.
Lindsay is entitled to
interest on the judgment from the date of the verdict
until the date that registry funds were disbursed to
him. Accordingly, on remand, the trial court must
recalculate the interest due, adjust the application of
moneys paid to interest and to principle, and
determine what amounts remain unpaid.

*681 II. Date that Interest Began to Accrue
% 18 PTI contends that the trial court erred in
denying PTI's motion for satisfaction of judgment in
relation to the December **107 23, 2003 payment.
— Specifically, PTI claims that the trial court erred
in holding that interest on the judgment began to
accrue on the verdict date, rather than on the date the
judgment was effective. PTI claims that Washington
case law establishes this proposition, and further, that
the parties contracted that the interest would begin to
accrue on the effective date of the judgment.
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FN4. Lindsay claims that PTI did not timely
file a notice of cross-appeal, and, thus, some
of the issues PTI has raised in its crossappeal are not properly before this court.
Specifically, Lindsay claims that because
PTI did not file a Notice of Appeal within
30 days of the specific trial court decision
PTI wanted reviewed, PTI's cross-appeal
should be dismissed.
However, a
commissioner of this court heard this issue
and decided in favor of PTI. Accordingly,
we consider PTI's cross-appeal.
121 If 19 RCW4.56.il 0(4) m provides, in pertinent
part:

FN5. In 2004, the legislature added a section
to this statute, changing then RCW
4.56.110(3) to RCW 4.56.110(4).
[Jjudgments shall bear interest from the date of entry
at the maximum rate permitted under RCW
19.52.020 on the date of entry thereof. In any case
where a court is directed on review to enter judgment
on a verdict or in any case where a judgment entered
on a verdict is wholly or partly affirmed on review,
interest on the judgment or on that portion of the
judgment affirmed shall date back to and shall accrue
from the date the verdict was rendered.
We review a trial court's application of a statute de
novo. Hadley v. Maxwell 120 Wash.App. 137, 145,
84 P.3d 286 (2004).
[4J f 20 The trial court did not err in holding that
interest began to accrue from the date of the verdict
because the language of RCW 4.56.110(4) dictates
that result. The statute provides that when a verdict
is affirmed on review, interest accrues from the date
of the verdict. This is exactly what happened in this
case. PTI appealed the verdict to this court, and we
affirmed. The Washington Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
Accordingly, under the *682 plain
language of RCW 4.56.110(4), the interest began to
accrue from the date of the verdict.
|
21 Case law is also in accord with this
interpretation. In Hadley, 120 Wash.App. at 140, 84
P.3d 286, the plaintiffs obtained a favorable
judgment.
The defendants appealed to Division
Three of this Court, which affirmed. Hadley, 120
Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. The defendants
then appealed to the Washington Supreme Court
solely on a liability issue, and the court reversed.
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Hadlev. 120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. On
remand, a jury found for the plaintiffs again. Hadlev,
120 Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. The plaintiffs
sought interest on the earlier damages verdict
accruing from the date of the verdict. Hadlev, 120
Wash.App. at 140, 84 P.3d 286. Division Three
agreed, noting that the Supreme Court had only
reversed on the liability issue, thus impliedly
affirming the earlier damages award. Hadlev 120
Wash.App. at 146-47, 84 P.3d 286. The Hadlev
court then concluded that because it had affirmed the
earlier damages award without challenge, the interest
accrued from the date of the earlier verdict. Hadlev,
120 Wash.App. at 147, 84 P.3d 286.
\ 22 PTI claims that Kiessling v. N. W. Greyhound
Lines. 38 Wash.2d 289, 229 P.2d 335 0951), and
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
142 Wash.2d 654, 15 P.3d 115 (2000) dictate a
different result. PTI is incorrect. In Kiessling, the
Court held that "[tjhere is no statute in this state
providing for the accrual of interest from the date of a
verdict." Kiesslinz. 38 Wash.2d at 297, 229 P.2d
335. However, Kiessling was decided before the
pertinent provision of RCW 4.56.110(4) was enacted.
Accordingly, it is not dispositive.
t 23 Weyerhaeuser is also not dispositive. In that
case, Weyerhaeuser sought a declaration of coverage
from numerous insurance companies with regard to
property damage at several allegedly polluted sites
that Weyerhaeuser was required to clean up.
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 661, 15 P.3d 115.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the insurers with respect to some of the sites.
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 662, 15 P.3d 115.
On appeal, summary judgment was reversed, and the
issue went to **108 trial. *683Weyerhaeuser, 142
Wash.2d at 662-63, 15P.3d 115. After a jury found
for Weyerhaeuser, the trial court awarded interest on
the cost of the clean-up of one of the sites from the
date of the verdict. Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at
687, 15 P.3d 115.
The Court on appeal cited
Kiessling and held that interest for the nonliquidated
damages ran only from the date of judgment.
Weyerhaeuser, 142 Wash.2d at 687, 15 P.3d 115.
However, in Weyerhaeuser, the appeal reversed a
summary judgment and reinstated the case.
No
judgment on the merits existed at that time, therefore
no judgment was affirmed on appeal. When the trial
court entered judgment and awarded interest dating
back to the verdict, the provision in RCW
4.56.110(4) had not yet been triggered and interest
dating back to the verdict was not yet appropriate.

[5] 1 24 PTI also asserts that Lindsay is estopped
from claiming that interest accrual began on the
verdict date because Lindsay agreed that the
judgment would be effective on March 14, 2002.
While it is true that Lindsay signed the order staying
judgment that stated that the original judgment would
be effective on March 14, 2002, this order does not
even reference RCW 4.56.110(4), let alone expressly
purport to modify the parties' statutory rights after the
judgment has been affirmed on review.
While
judgments generally bear interest from the date of
entry, that rule changes to the date of the verdict once
a judgment has been affirmed on appeal.
Accordingly, the agreed effective date of the
judgment does not control the date for interest
accrual after the case was affirmed on appeal.

III. Award of Fees to Lindsay
f 25 PTI asserts that the trial court erred in awarding
Lindsay attorney fees in responding to PTI's efforts to
satisfy the judgment. PTI claims that fees could only
be awarded under RCW 49.48.030, and that the
subject of the dispute is so far removed from the
purpose of that statute that the fees were not justified.
Further, PTI contends, the amount of fees awarded
was so out of proportion to the amount of money in
dispute that the award was unreasonable.
[6] *684 ^f 26 The test for reviewing an award of
attorney fees is two-pronged.
First, we must
determine whether the relevant statute provides for an
award of fees; this is a question of law and is
reviewed de novo. Mehlenbacher v. DeMont, 103
Wash.App. 240, 244, 11 P.3d 871 (2000). Once we
have established that a legal basis exists for the
award, we then review the amount of the award under
the abuse of discretion standard. Tradewell Group,
Inc. v. Mavis. 71 Wash.App. 120, 126, 857 P.2d 1053
(1993).
121 If 27 RCW 49.48.030 provides, in pertinent part,
that "[i]n any action in which any person is
successful in recovering judgment for wages or salary
owed to him, reasonable attorney's fees, in an amount
to be determined by the court, shall be assessed
against said employer or former employer [.]" The
statute is remedial and is entitled to liberal
construction to effect its purpose. Dautel v. Heritage
Home Center, Inc.. 89 Wash.App. 148, 152, 948 P.2d
397(1997).
f 28 The statute provides a basis for the trial court's
award of fees to Lindsay. Lindsay requested fees for
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responding to PTI's motions to satisfy the judgment
and motions to clarify the court's rulings. Lindsay
also requested fees for discussions with PTI
attempting to resolve the dispute.
Lindsay was
successful in opposing PTI's motions and prevailed
on the issue of when interest began to accrue. "The
purpose of awarding interest on a judgment is to
compensate a party having the right to use money
when it has been denied use of that money." Aguirre,
118 Wash.App. at 241. 75 P.3d 603. Establishing
the amount of interest due is part of determining the
amount of recovery to which the party is entitled.
This is not so far removed from the purposes of a
statute that is aimed at compensating individuals who
successfully bring wage and salary claims.
An
interpretation of RCW 49.48.030 that allows a party
who successfully obtains interest on money to which
he or she is entitled to recover attorney fees is
consistent with the broad, remedial purpose of the
statute. Accordingly, the statute supports the fee
award.
[81 *685 % 29 PTI notes that the issue of whether
RCW 49.48.030 allows for attorney fees in postjudgment litigation has not been **109 decided in
Washington. While this is true, there are cases from
other jurisdictions that support Lindsay's position. In
Velez v. Vassallo. 203 F.Supp.2d. 312, 315
(S.D.N.Y.2002), the defendants challenged a Fair
Labor Standards Act claim default judgment against
them almost a year after the judgment.
The
reviewing court held that plaintiffs were entitled to
reasonable fees and costs in defending that motion,
noting that "prevailing plaintiffs in FLSA cases are
entitled to attorneys fees for prosecuting or defending
appeals.
Plaintiffs successful defense of a postjudgment motion is indistinguishable in principle."
Velez, 203 F.Supp.2d at 315 (internal citations
omitted). Similarly, in Weyant v. Okst, 198 F.3d
31L 316 (2nd Cir.1999), the court held that "[a]
prevailing 1983 plaintiff is entitled to recover
reasonable attorneys fees," and that "[t]his principle
applies not only to the cost of obtaining a favorable
judgment but also to the cost of successfully
defending that judgment, whether against postjudgment motions, or against an appeal." (internal
citations omitted). In general, if the applicable law
allows the trial court to grant attorney fees, that
statute is also interpreted as allowing fees to the
prevailing party on appeal. 14A Karl B. Tegland,
Washington Practice: Civil Procedure 37.13, at 572
(1st ed.2003). This rule should also apply to postjudgment litigation in defense of the amount of the
judgment.
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f 30 Further, the amount awarded was not an abuse
of discretion. Lindsays attorney submitted a bill for
services rendered for Lindsay between November
2003 and April 2004. This bill included costs and
fees for services related to opposing PTIs motions
regarding interest and the removal of liens on PTIs
properties.
The total amount of the bill was
$29,681.00.
The trial court awarded Lindsay
$29,643.00, apparently accepting virtually all of the
fees and costs as reasonable. PTI asserts that the fee
award is unreasonable because it is significantly more
than the *686 amount in controversy. PTI points out
that while the award was over $29,000, the amount in
controversy was only one months interest:
$17,926.97.
[91 f 31 PTIs assertions are unavailing. The amount
of the award is not dispositive of the reasonableness
of the award. Further, PTI has made no specific
allegations that the hourly fee charged was
unreasonable or that Lindsays attorneys charged for
hours spent on unsuccessful claims, duplicated effort,
or otherwise unproductive time. See Mayer v. City
of Seattle. 102 Wash.App. 66, 82. 10 P.3d 408
(2000).
Washington courts have refused to find
abuse of discretion in a fee award when the only
argument is that the fees grossly exceeded the value
of the case. See, e.g., Lay v. Hass, 112 Wash.App.
818.826,51 P.3d 130(2002) (refusing to overturn an
award when the defendant's sole argument was that
the fee awarded was 31 times the total value of the
case). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
the award of fees.

IV. Lindsay's Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal
\ 32 Lindsay requests his attorney fees under RAP
18.1 and RCW 49.48.030 for both his underlying
action and in defending his result against PTI's crossappeal.
As previously noted, RCW 49.48.030
provides that employees who successfully recover
judgment for wages or salary owed shall receive
reasonable attorney fees. Lindsay has prevailed on
his appeal, and he has successfully defended against
PTI's cross-appeal. Accordingly, we award him his
attorney fees and costs on appeal.
f 33 Affirmed in part.
Reversed in part and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
WE CONCUR: ELLINGTON, A.C.J., and BAKER,
J.
Wash.App. Div. 1,2005.
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